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Reinsurance is the most important method of insurance companies’ actuarial risk 
management. Insurance companies’ internal factors of the reinsurance demand 
in the Republic of Croatia are examined in this paper. Random effects panel 
model was estimated by using the data about internal characteristics of 19 
insurers in the period between  2006 and 2011. The results of empirical analysis 
show that important factors of the insurance companies’ decisions regarding the 
purchase of reinsurance are leverage, size, return on investment, ownership 
structure, as well as a share of non-life insurance in total insurance business. 
Underwriting result and asset volatility do not show statistically significant effect 
on reinsurance demand in the Croatian insurance market. 
Keywords: reinsurance, insurance companies, insurers’ internal characteristics 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
By underwriting risks, insurance companies expose themselves to risk. 
The main risk for insurance companies is variation of actual loss from those 
predicted. Namely, the insurers are characterized by inversion of production 
process in a way that they sell insurance products and determine premiums before 
knowing actual losses. Although there are various methods of insurance 
companies’ underwriting risk management, from coinsurance and pools to 
alternative risk transfer (insurance securitization, insurance derivatives, 
contingent financing), reinsurance is mostly used. According to Webb et al. 
(2002) there are six functions which reinsurance provides to insurance 
companies: stabilization of loss experience, large-line capacity, financing (surplus 
relief), catastrophe protection, underwriting assistance and withdrawal from 
territory or class of business. There are several types of reinsurance contracts, 
quota share and surplus share as categories of pro rata reinsurance, and per risk, 
per occurrence as well as aggregate excess as types of excess of loss reinsurance.  
Since reinsurance reduces variability of insurance company’s cash flow 
as well as its financial leverage, the decision on buying reinsurance belongs to 
both risk management and capital management decision making (Garven and 
Lamm Tennant, 2003). As efficiency of risk management of insurance company 
depends on operational and financial characteristics of the company, the 
reinsurance decision should also vary according to the same factors (Adams, 
1995). Indeed, based on theoretical considerations as well as empirical studies, all 
of which are based on developed insurance markets, the main factors that 
determine reinsurance demand are leverage, size, result of underwriting activities, 
investment returns, and ownership structure. There is a question if the same 
determinants are influential in undeveloped insurance markets, as Croatian 
insurance market is.  
The Croatian market is characterized by low insurance penetration of 
0.73 percent of GDP for life and 1.77 percent of GDP for non-life business in 
2011. Insurance density was 80 EUR for life business and 221 EUR for non-life 
in 2011 (Swiss Re, 2012). The insurance industry is dominated by non-life 
insurance with 73.4 percent share in total insurance premium. There were 27 
insurance companies operated in the market in 2011, 10 of which are engaged 
entirely in non-life business, 10 are composite and 7 provide life insurance 
exclusively. There is only 1 company that offers reinsurance (Croatian financial 
services supervisory agency, 2012). Most of the reinsurance is bought abroad. As 
compared to the world average, insurance companies in Croatia cede more 
insurance premiums to reinsurance market. Precisely, 14.25 percent of insurance 
premiums collected by the Croatian insurance companies in non-life business are 
transferred to reinsurance while the world average is 9 percent. In the life 
business 4.05 percent of the total life insurance premiums are ceded to reinsurers 
in Croatia in comparison to 2 percent average for the world (Croatian financial 
services supervisory agency, 2012; International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors, 2012).  
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Considering the existing empirical research that is entirely based on 
developed countries, along with the lack of the reinsurance demand analysis in 
emerging markets, as well as the characteristics of insurance market in Croatia, 
the main aim of this research is to determine internal factors that influence 
insurance companies’ demand for reinsurance in Croatia.  
According to the authors’ best knowledge this is the first paper that 
analyses factors of insurance companies’ decision making on reinsurance 
purchase in Croatia and in emerging markets in general, thus contributing to the 
literature tackling the reinsurance demand in the specific insurance and economic 
environment.  
The paper is organized as it follows. The next section provides literature 
review. The data and methodology are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents 
and discusses results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Mayers and Smith (1990) research determinants that influence the 
decision of insurance companies on reinsurance purchase. The sample consists of 
1.276 non-life insurers with different ownership structure in 1981 from A. M. 
Best database. Reinsurance demand is measured by ratio of reinsurance ceded to 
total insurance premium. The results of cross-sectional regression show that the 
ownership structure has statistically significant influence on the demand for 
reinsurance, indicating that firms with more concentrated ownership have greater 
demand for reinsurance while those organized as stock companies buy fewer 
reinsurance in comparison to mutual insurers and Loyd’s. Group insurers and 
subsidiaries demand more reinsurance. Size, credit standing, line-of-business 
concentration and geographic concentration have negative influence on 
reinsurance demand. The line of business's concentration is negatively related to 
reinsurance purchase. 
Adams (1995) observes reinsurance decisions of life insurers in New 
Zealand in 1988 - 1993 period.  The model predicts the impact of organizational 
form, firm size, product range and leverage. Dependent variable is ratio of annual 
reinsurance premiums ceded to total annual premium income. It is predicted that 
reinsurance demand is higher for mutual companies than for stock companies. In 
addition, for firm size, natural log of total market value of assets is used, implying 
that smaller insurers have higher reinsurance demand. Product range is measured 
by a Herfindahl concentration index (calculated using six major lines of products) 
and it is expected that reinsurance will be higher in more specialized companies. 
Last hypothesis is that the leverage (ratio of the annual actuarial value of the life 
fund to the market value of total assets) has positive effect on reinsurance 
demand. The results of the research show that all independent variables are 
statistically significant but only firm size and leverage have expected sign. 
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Mutual companies have lower reinsurance demand than stock companies and 
multiproduct companies have higher reinsurance demand than specialized 
companies. 
Using data on insurance companies in the period 1996 – 1999, Powell 
and Sommer (2002) examine the demand for reinsurance on U.S. insurance 
market. This study distinguishes internal and external reinsurance. Empirical 
results for the simultaneous equations regression indicate that insurers with more 
total assets cede less reinsurance, and highly levered insurers cede more 
reinsurance. The coefficient of geographic concentration is significantly negative 
only in external reinsurance. Line of business concentration and the ratio of tax-
exempt investment income to total investment income are positively related to 
demand for internal reinsurance. The ratio of insurer's assets to the sum of group's 
assets is significantly negative with internal reinsurance equation. This research 
shows that internal reinsurance is significantly negative in external reinsurance 
equation but external reinsurance is not significant in internal reinsurance 
equation. 
Garven and Tennant (2003) investigate the factors that determine 
demand for reinsurance in the U.S. by applying the panel data analysis on the 
1980-1987 database. In accordance with earlier research, they test four 
hypotheses. They try to prove that demand for reinsurance will be greater for 
insurers that have higher leverage and lower correlation between the firm’s 
investment returns and claims costs. Also, insurers that write “longer-tail” lines of 
insurance and insurers that concentrate their investments in tax-favoured assets 
should have higher demand for reinsurance. The results of regression estimation 
confirm most of the model predictions. Demand for reinsurance is positively 
related to leverage, asset volatility, and length of tail (claim delay) and negatively 
related to the correlation between investment returns and claims costs. The tax 
shield effect is not empirically confirmed in this study. 
Factors which might influence reinsurance decision of Australian 
insurers are examined by Carneiro and Sherris (2005). They test theoretical 
hypotheses with OLS model with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) and 
estimate the impact of leverage, size, taxes, return on investment and company 
structure on demand for reinsurance. Using a panel-data set (1996-2001) which 
provides 543 observations, they find that only leverage has a significant positive 
influence on the demand for reinsurance in Australia. This confirms the 
importance of the amount of capital on the insurers’ liabilities for the reinsurance 
decisions process. However, company size, taxes, investment return and company 
structure are not statistically significant in their research.  
Reissaus and Wambach (2005) test reinsurance demand on German 
insurance market. They observe the reinsurance decisions on the sample of 139 
insurers in the period from 1994 to 2003. In their model, independent variables 
are divided in two groups. First group named Risk allocation tests the influence 
of risk spreading (size, ownership structure), bankruptcy avoidance (technical 
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leverage), solvability regulation (solvency ratio according to local regulatory 
requirements), tax optimization (convexity of tax function) and underinvestment 
avoidance (growth). Second group, Risk management service, tests the impact of 
monitoring (efficiency gain), signalling (quality of claims liability management) 
and reinsurance accounting (relation to balance sheet items with a similar impact 
on annual accounts). This research confirms the significant negative influence of 
size and ownership structure. Size is measured as ratio of accounted assets total 
related to the sample mean of accounted assets total and for ownership structure a 
dummy variable is used. Technical leverage as one of the most important 
variables in every study is also confirmed in this research. Insurers with high 
technical leverage cede more reinsurance. This research finds the significant 
negative influence of solvability regulation. This is measured with two proxies, 
first is dummy for the solvency ratio gross (significant positive) and second is 
solvency ratio gross itself (significant negative). Convexity of tax function 
(absolute value of the normal loss probability) and reinsurance accounting (ratio 
of equalization reserve according to German GAAP and case reserves gross) are 
also significantly negative. The growth (of accounted investments) and efficiency 
gain (ratio of insurer’s technical result before tax to gross premiums written) are 
positive and significant. 
Kader and Adams (2007) evaluate the effects of the underwriting risk, 
solvency risk and expected taxes on demand for reinsurance in the United 
Kingdom life insurers market. Panel data includes 635 insurers/year observations 
for the period between 1992 and 2004. Dependent variable in their research is 
ratio of the amount of reinsurance premiums ceded in year t minus the amount of 
reinsurance premiums ceded in year t-1 and gross insurance premiums in year t 
minus 1 including reinsurance assumed. They predict that insurers with higher 
underwriting risk need more reinsurance coverage to mitigate solvency risk. 
Solvency risk is estimated through free asset ratio (reverse leverage) and insurers 
that have more free assets will cede less reinsurance. They observed relationship 
between reinsurance decision and before-planning tax convexity and predicted 
negative relation. Tax convexity is measured as the excess of the marginal tax 
rate over the effective tax rate in that year. Also, it is predicted that the 
relationship between level of reinsurance and before-planning marginal tax rates 
(MTR) is negative. This study confirms that insurers with higher underwriting 
risk use more reinsurance and that higher level of leverage increases the demand 
for reinsurance. Also, it is confirmed that low marginal tax rates cause more 
reinsurance demand. Additionally, tax convexity is not significant in the 
reinsurance decision process. 
Using 1990 – 2004 panel data Wang, Chang, Lai and Tzeng (2008) 
analyse the demand for reinsurance in U.S. insurance market using sample of 36 
demutualized insurers. They try to prove that demand for reinsurance by 
converting insurers will be reduced after conversion. To measure the demand for 
reinsurance, researchers used the changes in reinsurance ratios. The data are 
analysed with a two-stage selection regression model. The results of the research 
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show that there is decrease in the demand for reinsurance of the non-affiliated 
reinsurers by converting insurers after conversion and increase in the demand for 
reinsurance of the affiliated reinsurers. The relationship between return on assets 
variable and demutualized dummy has expected negative sign. The same is true 
for the coefficient of the interaction of leverage and demutualized dummy 
variable which is positive and significant, but only for reinsurance from non-
affiliated reinsurers. Otherwise, coefficient is negative. Also, business-
concentration is significant positive to the demand for reinsurance from non-
affiliated reinsurers after conversion. Firm size is significantly negative. 
Reinsurance demand on the medical malpractice insurance market in the 
U.S. is analysed by Lei and Schmit (2008). They used data for 131 reinsurers 
specializing in medical malpractice and 268 insurers in the period from 1995 to 
2001. To get the dependent variable, they measure the relative amount of 
reinsurance purchased by primary insurers. It is predicted that leverage, loss 
volatility, tax, group and industry liquidity have positive influence on the 
dependent variable, while size, loss development, return on equity, industry price 
and industry loss development have negative influence on the demand for 
reinsurance. Four independent variables have ambiguous influence: 
specialization, geographic Herfindahl, physician-directed (PD) and non-PD-stock. 
The main hypothesis is that there will be the difference between the demand for 
reinsurance by the PD medical malpractice insurers and non-PD-directed medical 
malpractice insurers. The data are analysed by applying the two regression 
models. The results of the regression models show that all independent variables 
are statistically significant with the expected sign, except the loss volatility and 
the three reinsurance industry variables. Furthermore, non-PD insurers buy more 
reinsurance than PD medical malpractice insurers. 
 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Based on the literature reviewed regarding the determinants of insurance 
companies’ decision making on reinsurance purchase, we selected a set of firm 
specific characteristics that might impose a significant effect on reinsurance 
demand in Croatia. The number of insurance companies, the time period and 
choice of variables are determined by data availability.  
The empirical analysis is based on the sample that consisted of 19 
insurance companies that were active in the Croatian insurance market in the 
period from 2006 to 2011. The sample is representative since the share of 
premiums of the analysed companies in total insurance premiums was higher than 
90 percent in each of the analysed years. In order to get more observations we use 
annual panel data. Since some of the data on variables for some companies and 
years are missing, our sample is unbalanced. The total number of observation is 
90. 
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The data are extracted from annual reports of insurance companies 
collected by Financial Agency (2013). Part of the data is based on the official 
statistics of Croatian financial services supervisory agency (2007-2012). Data on 
ownership structure are obtained from annual reports of Croatian Insurance 
Bureau (2007-2012). 
Dependent variable is measured by the ratio of reinsurance expense to 
total premium revenue. We investigate influence of seven insurers’ specific 
factors as potential determinants of reinsurance demand. 
According to the previous empirical studies, leverage is one of the most 
important determinants of reinsurance demand. Leverage reflects the degree to 
which the insurers use debt as its financing source. The insurance companies’ 
liabilities are dominantly consisted of insurance reserves which represent 
insurance companies’ liabilities to policyholders. Higher leverage implies higher 
risk of insolvency. Thus, insurance companies with higher leverage have less own 
funds to absorb financial and operational losses that result from unexpected 
events and demand reinsurance more compared to the companies with lower level 
of leverage. Leverage ratio is approximated by ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets. 
Insurance company size could reflect its strength and ability to reduce 
the expected bankruptcy costs. Large company size means large number of units 
exposed to risk, which reduces the deviation of actual losses from those expected. 
Larger insurance companies are able to exploit economies of scale and increase 
efficiency in both underwriting activities and loss adjustment, which result in 
smaller demand for reinsurance. The same insurance companies employ 
specialised staff that are more effective in realization of the risk underwriting and 
risk management functions, resulting in lesser need for reinsurance (Adams, 
1995). On the contrary, smaller insurers have fewer resources to realize these 
functions efficiently. Moreover, insurance company size may be an indicator of 
diversification opportunities whose increasing should lower insurer risk. 
Consequently, we expect negative relationship between insurance company size 
and reinsurance demand. Natural logarithm of insurance company assets was 
applied as a measure of size.  
The underwriting result variable is measured by the loss ratio. The ratio 
is calculated as a share of the sum of claims, changes in claim provision and 
changes in other technical provisions (including changes in life assurance 
technical provisions where the policyholder bears the investment risk) in 
insurance premium earned (Croatian financial services supervisory agency, 
2012). Higher loss ratio indicates poorer underwriting activities. The ratio higher 
than 100 shows that the insurer is not able to cover the losses by insurance 
premium. It could be the result of inadequate assessment of risk and insurance 
premium, as well as in the short-run: catastrophic losses, inflation and change in 
the regulation (Webb et al. 2002). Additionally, in order to achieve higher market 
share and to improve performance in the short term, insurance companies may 
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alleviate level of risk underwriting standards. These actions may result in the 
problem of adverse selection and in an increase of risk. Based on the above 
mentioned, the positive direction of the nexus between underwriting results and 
reinsurance demand is expected. 
Beside risk underwriting, the important insurance companies’ activity is 
investment. Return on investment activities may compensate negative results of 
risk underwriting activities that may be produced by unexpected catastrophic 
losses. Thus, insurers with higher level of investment return will demand less 
reinsurance. The investment return is measured as the ratio of income from 
investments reduced by investment expenses to the amount of investment 
(Croatian financial services supervisory agency, 2012). 
In the existing empirical research the ownership structure is mainly 
referred to stock and mutual insurance companies. Despite the fact that mutual 
insurers are allowed by the law, all companies that operate in the Croatian 
insurance market are stock companies. However, in the Croatian market, as in the 
markets of other (post)transition countries, important characteristic of ownership 
is increasing foreign participation in the capital of insurance companies. Thus, we 
adapt the variable to the emerging market circumstances and test if the 
companies’ reinsurance demand may be influenced by domestic/foreign 
ownership. The expected sign of the variable is ambiguous. Precisely, foreign 
owners are mainly those from large European insurance companies and they are 
able to provide the insurers with additional capital more easily in comparison to 
domestic owners, resulting in lower reinsurance demand. On the other hand, 
reinsurance foreign owned companies could access reinsurance market at lower 
price, indicating more demand for reinsurance. Ownership structure is measured 
by the share of foreigners in the capital of insurance company.
The importance of non-life insurance or share of non-life insurance 
premiums in total premiums is used to control relationship between independent 
and dependent variables for including non-life, life and composite insurer in the 
sample. The reason is that for most of the years there are no separated data for life 
and non-life insurance business for composite insurance companies, which 
dominate Croatian insurance market. In comparison to life insurance, losses 
related to non-life insurance are less predictable and could have catastrophic 
character. Therefore, the positive sign of the importance of non-life insurance 
variable is expected. 
Asset volatility reflects the degree of instability of insurance companies 
business. Higher volatility implies greater risk. As the risk is increasing, 
insurance companies buy more reinsurance. The variable is measured by the ratio 
of difference between value of the assets in time t and t-1 to the asset value in 
time t-1. 
We form the following model of reinsurance demand: 
ititit uXy                                                                               (1) 
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where the subscripts i and t represent company and time, respectively.  
is the intercept term. Y is the dependent variable, that is, reinsurance ratio. X is 
the vector of observations on the explanatory variables that include leverage, size, 
underwriting result, investment return, ownership structure, the share non-life 
insurance premiums in total insurance premium, and volatility of asset; β is the 




4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all variables included in the 
model. The data show that the insurers transfer 8.7 percent written gross 
premiums to the reinsurance on average. Minimum value of reinsurance ratio is 0 
while the highest value of reinsurance ratio is 46.65 percent. Standard deviation 
of the variable has value 9.32 percent. 
The pair-wise correlation coefficients for all variables used in the 
analyses are given in Table 2. According to Gujaraty (2000) there is no problem 
of multicollinearity in our model. The data indicate that ownership variable has 
the greatest positive impact on the dependent variable. Correlation coefficient 
between those variables is 0.4456. The smallest correlation is between volatility 
of assets and reinsurance. The coefficient has value 0.0088.  
Table 1  
Descriptive statistics 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
The results of panel estimations are shown in Table 3. At first we run 
dynamic panel model estimation using two-step Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator developed by Arellano-Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover 
EKON. MISAO PRAKSA DBK. GOD XXIII. (2014.) BR. 1. (29-42)                 Ćurak, M., Utrobičić, M., Kovač, D.: FIRM... 
38 
(1995). However, negative and statistically insignificant coefficient of lagged 
dependent variable suggests that the nature of the model is not dynamic. 
Therefore we switch to static panel model estimator. We run both, fixed and 
random effects model. The choice between fixed and random effects is based on a 
Hausman test which tests more efficient model against a less efficient but 
consistent model. As it is indicated in the Table 3, p-value is statistically 
insignificant, implying using of random effects model. 
Table 2  
Pairwise Correlations 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 3  
Determinants of reinsurance demand (Panel estimation – random effects model) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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According to the results given in the Table 3, statistically significant 
factors of insurance companies’ decision making on reinsurance purchasing are 
leverage, size of insurers, return on investment, ownership structure and share of 
non-life insurance in total insurance business. Insignificance is shown by 
underwriting results as well as volatility of assets. Taking into consideration the 
sign of the statistically significant coefficients, the results confirm most of our 
predictions. The exception is investment return variable.  
As it is predicted by theoretical considerations, and confirmed by 
existing empirical research, leverage is positively correlated with reinsurance 
demand. Higher level of leverage implies higher exposure to risk and greater 
demand for reinsurance. The same result is found in most empirical studies 
(Adams, 1995; Powell and Sommer 2002; Garven and Tennant, 2003; Carneiro 
and Sherris, 2005; Reissaus and Wambach 2005; Kader and Adams, 2007; Lei 
and Schmit, 2008). 
Insurance company size negatively influences reinsurance purchasing. 
Larger company is more able to manage risk by itself and to reduce probability of 
bankruptcy. Precisely, larger companies are more successful in underwriting 
activities since they have large number of units exposed to risk which enable 
reduction of deviation actual losses from those expected. The result complies with 
the theory and with the results of existing empirical studies (Mayers and Smith, 
1990; Adams, 1995; Powell and Sommer 2002; Garven and Tennant, 2003; 
Reissaus and Wambach 2005, Lei and Schmit, 2008). 
Foreign owned insurance companies buy more reinsurance in 
comparison to the domestic ones. Easier access to reinsurance market at more 
favourable terms is the advantage for foreign owned companies in their risk 
management. 
As it is expected, share of non-life insurance in total insurance business 
is positively correlated to reinsurance. As insurance company is more engaged in 
non-life insurance, more losses are less predictable and it is more exposed to the 
risk of catastrophic losses.  
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper we investigate the internal characteristics of reinsurance 
demand. The analysis is performed on the sample of Croatian insurance 
companies in the period from 2006 to 2011 by using the static panel data 
methodology.  
The results show that insurance companies’ leverage, foreign ownership, 
and a share of non-life insurance in total insurance business positively affect 
reinsurance demand. Additionally, reinsurance purchasing is negatively related to 
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size. Contrary to the expectations, investment return shows positive impact on 
reinsurance purchasing.  
Thus, in order to achieve adequate reinsurance program which provides 
risk protection and insurance business stability as well as companies’ 
profitability, the insurance companies’ risk managers should take into account 
internal characteristics confirmed by this research in their decision making of 
reinsurance purchase. 
The study is limited by the fact that the data do not allow for the 
distinction among life and non-life insurance, as well as among various line of 
insurers’ business, especially in the field of non-life insurance which is 
characterized by heterogeneous insurance product with respect to risk. Thus, there 
is suggestion for the future research to take this into account when longer time 
series become available. Additionally, the existing model could be expanded for 
insurance and reinsurance industry (both domestic and foreign) factors. The 
cross-country analysis with a sample of emerging countries is suggested, along 
with including influences from macroeconomic and institutional environment of 
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SPECIFIČNE KARAKTERISTIKE TVRTKI I 





Reosiguranje predstavlja najznačajniju metodu upravljanja statističkim rizicima 
društava za osiguranja. U ovom radu analiziraju se unutarnji čimbenici koji 
određuju potražnju za reosiguranjem društava za osiguranje u Republici 
Hrvatskoj. Korištenjem podataka o karakteristikama 19 osiguratelja u razdoblju 
od 2006. do 2011. godine, procijenjen je panel  model sa slučajnim učincima. 
Rezultati empirijske analize pokazuju da su važni čimbenici odluke društava za 
osiguranje o kupnji reosiguranja: iinstrumentu, veličina, investicijski prinos, 
vlasnička struktura i udio neživotnog osiguranja u ukupnim poslovima 
osiguranja. Rezultat preuzimanja rizika i nestalnost imovine nemaju statistički 
značajan učinak na potražnju za reosiguranjem na hrvatskom tržištu osiguranja.   
Ključne riječi: reosiguranje, društva za osiguranje, interne karakteristike 
osiguratelja. 
JEL klasifikacija: G22 
